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'THRESHOLD GUARDIANS': THRESHOLD 
CONCEPTS AS GUARDIANS OF THE 
DISCIPLINE 
 
SETTING THE INTERDISCIPLINARY SCENE 
Writing about co-operation and solidarity means writing at the same time 
about rejection and mistrust. (Douglas, 1986, p. 1) 
Interdisciplinarity 
 
Interdisciplinarity has undoubtedly changed the landscape of academic work in 
recent years and, increasingly, students are also  ‘living the dream'; but it can be a 
dream of interdisciplinary possibilities that do not always come good, and have 
sometimes  ‘succeeded’ only when we offset a great deal of time and effort that 
went on in the background. It is the implications of some of those difficulties that 
will be explored here: there are often  ‘basic’ organisational difficulties but there 
are also profound difficulties for students facing conflicting epistemological claims 
and/or threshold concepts. What do you do when your tutors or supervisors are 
literally arguing from different premises, with the implication that meaning-
construction and intellectual reference points are as different as the physical 
buildings? 
 
Threshold concepts are very much the children of an interdisciplinary age: the idea 
arose (Meyer & Land, 2003) from interdisciplinary collaboration but also gained 
traction partly because it is a boon to thinking about learning across disciplinary 
fields. It offers a way to begin the task of understanding why disciplinary 
differences can run so deep, something which was simply not of interest in a world 
where academics rarely stepped outside their disciplinary knowledge for long (and, 
when they did, on their own terms). Considering incommensurability in 
interdisciplinary work through the lens of threshold concepts ought to enrich both 
discourses: as Carmichael (2010, p. 60)’s subject  ‘D’ put it  ‘[threshold concepts] 
help define the discipline’. 
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Interdisciplinarity and Us 
Too many claims have been made for interdisciplinary work to rehearse here (eg 
Klein's foundations for the field in Klein 1990, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2005; Lattuca 
2001; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons 2003). Calls to  ‘knock down walls’ and  
‘liberate knowledge’ from the  ‘restrictions’ of (mono)disciplines have become less 
strident with the widespread adoption of interdisciplinarity as institutional policy 
(eg Castronovo, 2000, pp. 781–90; Klein 1996, p. 224). Notable moments in its rise 
are Roy (1979, p. 165)'s much-quoted line that  ‘the real problems of society do not 
come in discipline-shaped blocks’ and the corollary that universities must move 
beyond the disciplines to formulate  ‘real’ solutions to  ‘real’ problems': a similar 
and influential thesis is that of  ‘Mode 2’ knowledge put forward originally by 
Gibbons, Limoges, & Nowotny (1994) and reformulated in Nowotny, Scott & 
Gibbons (2003). Similarly ambitious (but also similarly vague) claims were put 
forward for  ‘superconcepts’ by Wilson (2010). 
 
Publicly there is now little doubt expressed that interdisciplinary work will  
‘change the world’ both within and also beyond the academy, though locally the 
experience is sometimes more fractured (Townsend, Pisapia & Razzak, 2013). 
There is a sense (or a claim) that tangible and meaningful effects on  ‘real life', 
previously inaccessible to introspective monodisciplinary approaches and interests, 
can be reached successfully by interdisciplinary collaboration. 
Interdisciplinary Ravines 
There are difficulties with some of the more ambitious formulations which cannot 
be addressed fully here for reasons of space: put in brutally simple terms, it may be 
that even  ‘real life’ does not come in  ‘real-life shaped chunks', because it is 
different materials, and the formulation of distinct questions and answers, that 
tends to give rise to disciplinary expertise in the first place (see, for instance and 
across different fields, Concerns, 2001; Ziman, 2003; Rowland, 2006; Hunt, 1994; 
Fish, 1994 & 1995 and Davies, 2011).  Furthermore, new (inter)disciplines must 
create their own meanings, and will begin to look suspiciously comparable to  
‘traditional’ disciplines if they are to generate a disciplinary community. 
 
Translated into the discourse of threshold concepts, we are dealing with a claim 
that reducing concepts’ particularity (eg making them  ‘less difficult to understand’ 
or  ‘reducing their specialism’ by  ‘knocking down walls') makes them somehow 
easier to combine, and  ‘better', once combined. This seems less convincing in 
translation than it did in the original. That is not to say that the effort to combine 
them and do interdisciplinary work is not worthwhile or productive: but it 
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underlines that all too often,  ‘thinking outside the box’ requires the immediate 
construction of a new box with a different design and a different set of 
understandings for what constitutes  ‘success'.  
THRESHOLD CONCEPTS AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
To put it another way, incommensurability – the supposed bane of interdisciplinary 
work – is emphatically predicted by threshold concepts: they are   ‘transformative',  
‘irreversible',  ‘integrative',  ‘bounded', and  ‘troublesome'. Most of these terms 
prescribe difference from common or inexpert understanding: an irreversible, 
learned transformation in perspective can only be part of a shared understanding in 
a strictly defined context – a  ‘disciplined’ space (in both senses). A group who 
have distinctive, overlapping and potentially competing threshold concepts will 
approach the same task and materials very differently. Neither they nor disciplinary 
methods and values can simply be added to or multiplied by one another. 
Threshold concepts have, of course, been invoked to explore (inter)disciplinarity 
(Trowler, Saunders & Bamber, 2012, p. 24; Irvine & Carmichael, 2009, 
Carmichael, 2010) and could be used further in this regard, since they bring a sense 
of texture to the incommensurability that is so embedded in interdisciplinarity 
(Rowland, 2006, p. 87–103; Davies, 2011). Dexterity in interdisciplinarity is 
(l)earned: Land (2012), touching on many issues developed in here, argues that it 
is itself a threshold concept. Considering incommensurability in interdisciplinary 
work through the lens of threshold concepts ought to enrich both discourses. This 
study, in the spirit of the opening quote by the anthropologist Mary Douglas, 
intends to explore that possibility by focussing on breakdowns, evasions and other 
opportunistic  ‘tactics’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. 84). 
 
TROUBLE IN PARADISE 
In a monodisciplinary research environment, there is shared understanding 
(describable as  ‘shared threshold concepts') – enough for people to know how to 
disagree, for instance. In a teaching environment, the teacher's authority will 
normally be a proxy for this common ground, with the implied assurance that s/he 
will decide what is relevant. Thus, when awkward, interesting but tangential 
questions are asked, they are usually (and legitimately) evaded on the grounds 
there is a point  ‘which we need to stick to'. This commonality is so deep that 
should an eminent researcher ask  ‘what is the point of our subject?', the audience 
will generally expect that the questioner can offer some kind of coherent answer 
rather than treat it as an invitation to throw in the towel altogether. 
Interdisciplinary work brings its own particular frictions: one can more easily find 
oneself staring into the abyss of what authenticates and characterises the 
discipline(s) in question, and therefore  ‘the point we must stick to’ is an unknown. 
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More importantly, it is likely to evade any attempts to fix it: what can be drawn on 
to make judgements is itself subject to contestation. Will the group want a 
consensus about what is sought or tolerate huge ambiguity and polyvalence? How 
would a group decide whether it needed a consensus? By consensus? 
This kind of scenario is implicitly acknowledged in discussions about 
interdisciplinary research —  ‘stay clear on focus, extend the benefits of 
serendipity to more people, and remember that one size does not fit all', 
recommend Townsend et al (2013), after noting the calls for  ‘headspace’ by 
academics attempting to do meaningful interdisciplinary work. In practice this 
often means respecting each others’ expertise while patiently seeking ways to find 
the new mutual understandings that characterise successful interdisciplinary work. 
Much time can pass with a truce rather than genuine integration. This kind of 
situation is, of course, something that can, like anything else, be scrutinised by 
academic analysis or enquiry. The question is: by which methods? 
Disciplines as tribes 
Becher & Trowler (2001) famously dubbed disciplinary communities  ‘tribes'. 
Notwithstanding recent reformulations (especially Manathunga, Brew & Bamber, 
2012),  ‘tribes’ has advantages as a metaphor for disciplinary communities. 
'Tribes’ encountering others must form some kind of relationship (usually with the 
assumption, well-known to anthropologists, that  ‘we', unlike  ‘them', do things  
‘properly'); there may be trading, exclusion, assimilation, defence manoeuvres 
(such as retreat or fence-building) or outright aggression (colonisation, deprecation, 
disciplinary imperialism). In such encounters there will be a range of different 
artefacts and objects put to use, and/or shared  ‘zones’ established, sometimes 
deliberately, sometimes reluctantly. Notions such as Star & Griesemer (1989)'s  
‘boundary objects’ and Collins, Evans & Gorman (2007)'s  ‘trading zones’ are 
established motifs in the history of science where distinct groups with different 
interests must co-operate. Objects may have multiple meanings for different groups 
and where this polyvalency is permitted and understood, trade and communication 
is thereby facilitated. Should a particular group attempt to establish a monopoly on 
an object's meaning, however, then co-operation ceases and conflicts arise. 
Notwithstanding the frustration, these are interesting opportunities to discover 
more about the protagonists as they (re-)articulate their values in an attempt to 
establish that elusive hegemony (Rowland, 2006, pp. 87-103). The logical 
inference is that if threshold concepts can be  ‘enabling', they might also be 
implicated in disciplinary self-defence. 
 
In my experience of interdisciplinary research and teaching, threshold concepts 
have also been crucial  ‘objects', but enquiry into, and articulation of, their role has 
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tended to be implicit and inchoate. Through three metaphors, I wish to explore here 
the deployment of threshold concepts not as enabling  ‘doorways’ but rather as 
locked doors or  ‘threshold guardians'. 
Methodology and fieldnotes 
The material discussed below generally only appears during free-ranging reflective 
discussion; it touches on issues that are rarely discussed explicitly, generally to the 
extent that they are intractable: they are not likely to appear in questionnaires. The 
following fieldnotes came to light in varied contexts; some during formal study in 
academic development work as part of teaching on an MA at UCL, and others 
within an interdisciplinary programme on Evidence that ran at UCL from 2003, 
culminating in conferences during 2008 and a collected volume (Twining, Dawid 
& Vasilaki, 2011). As described in greater detail in Davies (2011, pp. 49-52), we 
(Stephen Rowland and myself) developed an approach that sought to privilege 
enquiry over conclusions and evaded the use of particular disciplinary methods that 
might exclude interesting but exotic pieces of information.  We were working 
ethnographically with partial glimpses of life within disciplines, in situations where 
tacit knowledge was emphatically not common knowledge. 
To give an evocative example, we spent several hours discussing the relative status 
of  ‘off-hand comments in the corridor’ and  ‘official’ communications in 
wondering what the programme  ‘actually was’ before deciding, essentially, to 
include anything that either of us thought was interesting or difficult as a starting 
point for sustained enquiry. Violations of expectations and a sense of being 
wrongfooted (whether in us or our colleagues), which were often initially attributed 
by many to  ‘personal differences’ or  ‘(lack of) manners', increasingly looked less 
like  ‘personal’ quirks or approaches as we explored them: they usually began to 
resemble the tips of disciplinary knowledge-and-praxis icebergs. Because these 
responses were so context-sensitive and unpredictable, each encounter was unique 
(unless it seemed to fall into a pattern). As I extended the habit of compiling such 
fieldnotes outside the Evidence project, certain broad types of interdisciplinary 
engagements and scenarios seemed to emerge in other contexts. 
Needless to say, this is not a quantitative study. It is at the more elusive end of the 
ethnographic scale and evokes the tradition of anthropological fieldwork rather 
than large scale social science questionnaires.   
 
This does not mean that my examples are trivial: what they share is that they did so 
at moments where the operation of the discipline (and good candidates for 
threshold concepts) were implicitly challenged. In each case, the disciplinary 
construct was protected from the implicit challenge, and threshold concepts 
became  ‘threshold guardians'. They are enactments of an  ‘expert pragmatism’ that 
acknowledged and responded to the unexpected emergence of incommensurability. 
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Limitations of This Enquiry 
If we had a table of canonical threshold concepts against which to map these 
moments of incommensurability, this would be less of an enquiry: it would be 
possible to indicate which universally-accepted threshold concepts were being 
violated and move on to building a solid and canonical taxonomy for classifying  
‘threshold guardian’ moments. Fortunately, such instrumentalism has generally 
been eschewed in the discourse of threshold concepts. 
 
My suggested framework is therefore no more than possible starting points and is 
deliberately restricted to being evocative metaphors that highlight the 
distinctiveness of these encounters. Just as the ethnographer is interested in the 
social use of cognitive objects as much as their content, so too we can begin an 
enquiry into the swampy areas of how a discipline's threshold concepts (or 
plausible candidates for the title) feature in the building and maintenance of 
disciplinary integrity by  ‘tribes’ in  academia. 
THRESHOLD GUARDIANS 
Scenario 1.  ‘Surrender your passport' 
Students moving from one discipline to another, typically in the transition from 
undergraduate to postgraduate, may find they cannot take their most cherished 
threshold concepts with them. A Chemical Engineer told me of the difficulty she 
has  ‘persuading’ (perhaps rather than  ‘teaching') Chemistry graduates entering her 
field precisely what  ‘balancing an equation’ means in applied Chemical 
Engineering (industrial plants-based) rather than in pure Chemistry (labs). 
Different margins of error are permitted in the respective disciplines because of 
their criteria of what is sufficient for explanation and application. Chemical 
Engineers have their eye on such factors as cost and  ‘acceptable (material and 
financial) losses', and therefore cannot disregard minor fluctuations that barely 
qualify as curiosities in a lab. The loss of a single gram in an experiment involving 
test-tubes — perhaps attributable to a barely-detectable spillage during the mixing 
— could translate into thousands of tons on the scale that chemical engineers work 
at. On the other hand, chemical engineers must allow for larger margins of error 
simply because of the scale of their operations. What is at stake in chemical 
equations will subtly but profoundly alter as someone moves from one field to the 
other, even if this seems a good candidate for being a threshold  ‘skill’ (Sanders et 
al, 2012) rather than a threshold  ‘concept'. 
This disciplinary difference is not initially epistemological (physical chemistry has 
not changed) but becomes so when we consider  ‘balancing an equation’ as a 
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threshold concept. Considerations arising in the application of  ‘pure’ theory are 
what make the disciplines distinctive: what is critical is that there are very different 
consequences when mistakes are made and only then do different aspects of  
‘balancing an equation’ become more or less interesting. My fieldnote notes her 
(the aforementioned Chemical Engineer) wry comment highlighting one other 
aspect that would be less inconvenient on a small-scale and in a laboratory:  ‘I just 
don't want them to blow up the plant: it's messier than blowing up a lab.' 
This kind of difference can be counter-intuitive: there is a tendency for complete 
outsiders to assume that neighbouring disciplines will have common 
understandings but it is often precisely in those apparent overlaps where threshold 
concepts are most energetically applied, precisely to make disciplinary work 
distinctive. In other words,  ‘what counts as balancing an equation', far from 
constituting some  ‘pan-Chemical’ understanding, might be the difference between 
a chemist and a chemical engineer (being neither, I am wary of assuming I can 
elaborate further on this topic). 
These kinds of differences can of course be widely acknowledged and publicly (ie 
within the field) debated: to move to a completely different intellectual corner, 
historians of religion and anthropologists have grappled for many years with the 
need to displace and then re-place conceptions of religion (or programmatically 
dispense with it altogether), precisely because modern assumptions will almost 
certainly mislead students. Rüpke (2007) spends his first chapter (38 pages) 
tackling every ancient religionist's lot — the so-called  ‘negative canon’ of what 
religion was not in the Roman world. In anthropology, Saler (1993) is a useful 
overview of (and pragmatic response to) the same kinds of issues: western 
conceptions should, for him,  be subjected to the same contextualisation as non-
western ones, becoming objects of study rather than unproblematised methods. 
Non-western ideas should similarly be used alongside them as heuristics for 
comparative purposes.  ‘Religion’ cannot persist in anything remotely like its 
familiar westernised form. 
Boundary crossing is not out of the question in these kinds of situations, but there 
is no room for compromise: one must  ‘go native’ in the new field by surrendering 
the irreversible change of perspective that had previously been obtained, and taking 
on the local threshold concepts on their own terms. If the change in perspective 
really is irreversible (and I suspect it is), it must be effortfully set aside cognitively 
in the new context, and existing disciplinary identity  ‘loosened’, as Land (2012, p. 
182) puts it. This implies a post-disciplinary stage of academic practice, where one 
must learn to evade the hard-won understanding enshrined in threshold concepts in 
order to do interdisciplinary work. 
 
JASON P DAVIES 
8 
 2.  ‘Here be Dragons' 
My second scenario is of experts  ‘locking the doors’ to keep the disciplined in (or 
perhaps  ‘safe') and draws on an example from an interdisciplinary email thread 
that I have discussed elsewhere (Davies, 2010). Under discussion was the  
‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, which explores differences (if any) of the 
intelligence of a  ‘comprehending being’ from a computer programme (or other  
‘uncomprehending being'). 
A physiologist wrote: 
I don't have patience for arguments from the Chinese Room experiment, 
because as a physiologist I consider the human brain to be a machine. 
A historian responded: 
Who makes that judgement … The brain? How does the brain do so? 
Automatically, presumably, if we keep to the logic of your position? … Or are 
you implicitly distinguishing  ‘brain’ from  ‘self'? 
And a pharmacologist responded privately to that historian: 
If the brain is not a machine, then what is it? The only other possibility seems 
to be start talking about souls or some other form of mysticism. I'd prefer not 
to do that myself. 
This is a rich exchange and I must, for reasons of space, limit my observations. 
Each practitioner has reached the limits of where their fundamental concepts obtain 
and will go no further: for the physiologist, this is  ‘organism as machine'; the 
historian seeks to preserve the historiographically necessary category of non-
mechanical  ‘human agents'; and for the pharmacologist, we have  ‘organism as 
machine’ but more explicitly non-deistically. 
The final, private, comment makes explicit something that the first, more public, 
email only implies: an awareness that outside normal disciplinary frameworks, not 
only do habitual explanatory structures fail to provide useful insight, those 
concepts might fail to find any purchase. Each beats a tactical retreat from the 
engagement rather than expose their essential concepts to such danger. The 
historian, on the other hand, cannot produce a meaningful historical account if 
humanity's actions derive from machine behaviour and must therefore seek 
something with conscious and deliberate agency, though he is nervous of where he 
is forced to go (and in fact the exchange ended there). 
Another example was relayed to me personally, where a professor of History was 
despairing of Derridean deconstructionism. His (not incorrect) reading was that 
adopting such an approach meant that  ‘one can never escape from a text'. Given 
historians’ heavy reliance on texts and particularly their need to  ‘take ideas out of 
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the text’ with the assumption that they have a reasonable chance of conveying  
‘factual information', his response was simple: he ignored Derrida, though not 
without some genuine and persistent misgivings that he was neglecting something 
potentially important. 
Scenario 3.  ‘Cattle-raiding' 
On the same theme, another historian put things differently: my note of his 
response paraphrases a more assertive stance: 
The interesting question is not whether Derrida and his peers were correct 
but why they backed themselves into a corner where it was almost impossible 
to say anything about the world. 
The best form of defence is attack; by historicising Derrida, he neutralised the 
threat of the infinite, imagined and imagining textual world with an entrance but no 
exit: no longer is there a text into which one steps, never to return, but rather a 
historically real man creating a historically real text. One threshold concept, (the 
wor(l)d of the text) has lost out to others (chronological and spatial locatedness); 
and the hegemony of historical knowledge re-established by the sheer act of 
knowledge-construction. 
Deconstructionism can now be referred to without any threat of contagion because 
all meaning has been assimilated to a historicising discourse: the infinite text-world 
now stems from a particular agent, the construction of a particular culture, time and 
location. But then, of course, a textual critic might flip it back by saying  ‘the 
author’ has now been inscribed as a historical text: the academic game continues. 
And this is not to say that postmodern textuality is ignored or utterly denatured in 
history, far from it: Derridean methods are certainly heeded but principally used to 
sharpen history's sword, as it were (as occurs, for instance, in Jenkins, 1995). 
Why  ‘cattle-raiding’ as a metaphor? Indo-European myths of cattle asserted that 
not only was the tribe granted their cattle at the beginning of time by the deity, they 
were granted all cattle: any found in the possession of neighbouring tribes had 
therefore been stolen at some point and one was therefore perfectly entitled to go 
and get them  ‘back’ from the other, alien, tribe (Walcot, 1979). That this game is 
rigged from the start to justify any appropriation is obvious to us in this example, 
but less obvious is the similarity of the expectation in academia that almost any 
field of activity or knowledge can legitimately be appropriated into disciplinary 
discourse. That process often comes about by asserting an account that brings 
threshold concepts into play. Once seen through a disciplinary gaze, the material 
has been claimed. 
 
This is perhaps more aggressive as a metaphor than my example invites, but I have 
known more energetic sallies than these examples to  ‘assimilate’ other disciplines’  
‘property'. Conversely, there are areas where disciplines politely decline to go: 
anthropologists, for instance, nowadays virtually never mount raids or even send 
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scouts to classical antiquity, even though the two had strong links in the early 20th 
century. This is also despite the fact that as the discipline builds up a past for itself, 
it is increasingly dealing with historical rather than contemporary material. In 
contrast, the new interdiscipline of cognitive science of religion, has no such 
qualms and is cheerfully sending out would-be colonists to relevant fields (eg 
Martin & Sørensen, 2011). 
COMING CLEAN FOR THE SAKE OF THE STUDENTS 
In this initial exploration of these difficulties, I risk going against two grains: both 
interdisciplinarity and threshold concepts are generally deployed as  ‘enabling’ (see 
eg Cousin, 2010;  Kinchin 2010; Irvine & Carmichael 2009, esp. 116–117) and to 
point at  ‘disabling’ practices might easily be understood to be identifying  ‘areas 
for improvement’ and  ‘practices that should be deprecated’. That is far from my 
intention: attempts to  ‘solve’ these issues would lead to an infinite regress as each 
new and distinctive approach created its own ravines and abysses, border 
skirmishes and so on. Land (2012)'s succinct echoing of many of the 
epistemological and institutional difficulties underlines how reflexive one must 
become to do crossdisciplinary work. 
Yet we have a dilemma: to permit or even encourage explicit disciplinary self-
defence could be a step backwards by acting as a charter for disciplinary 
imperialism and in appearing to lend legitimacy to refusals to engage with other 
fields of expertise on a suitably humble and open-minded footing. I do not wish to 
go in that direction – we are not yet in a position to be complacent about interactive 
work in the academy but its value seems undeniable (see for instance the range of 
initiatives and variable outcomes of collaborative work in Walsh & Kahn, 2010). 
Suffer the  ‘Children' 
There is more: postgraduates are almost certainly the group who suffer the most in 
interdisciplinary projects. Firstly, they do not have the luxury of waiting to see if 
the project bears fruit or not: they will have a viva all too soon. 
Secondly, if obtaining a PhD is generally the point at which they internalise the 
threshold concepts and customs of their discipline (Kiley, 2009), they are unlikely 
to be dextrous enough to to practice threshold guardianship: students may well be 
expecting their knowledge to fit together more cohesively than I have suggested it 
will. In practice, when their supervisors in different departments dodge the most 
incommensurable issues, the student, probably suffering from chronic liminality, is 
left to traverse the ravines alone in a high-stakes experiment. 
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Thirdly, they do not have a single group into which they can be assimilated and  
‘get to know the ropes': they must simultaneously enter more than one community 
– which makes impossible any persistent sense of immersion and naturalisation. In 
short, their PhD is almost primarily in interdisciplinarity itself, and in  ‘subjects', 
second. 
 
The dynamics of disciplinary boundary work must, it seems, be made more 
explicit: not to do so simply becalms new members of our community unfairly and, 
if my argument rings true, rather dishonestly. How then might we do a better job of 
showing them a fuller picture of what disciplined academic life is like without 
empowering arrogant  ‘discipline wars’ or the evasion of genuine interdisciplinary 
enquiry? 
Distinction over Definition 
One possibility is a promoting a culture of disciplinary distinction (identifying 
characteristic aspects) rather than definition (identifying dividing lines and 
borders).  ‘Walls’ seem increasingly unhelpful as a metaphor. This could be done 
in academic practice or academic development circles. This in turn would make 
heuristics such as threshold concepts increasingly nuanced as we articulated  ‘the 
way we do things'. And how might it end? It ends just the way it began and was 
then conducted: pragmatically, and in response to a contextual sense of  ‘whether 
we have reasonably answered the question for our current purposes.’ Given that 
there is no realistic possibility of mastering every discipline one encounters, there 
is no other option than this kind of  ‘immediate-need’ pragmatism, which is itself 
typical of  ‘Mode 2’ knowledge: the conversation itself cannot be anything but an 
enactment of interdisciplinarity. 
 
The potential role of (articulating) threshold concepts will be obvious, indeed 
almost unavoidable, if this approach is taken. If thinking about threshold concepts 
is useful pedagogically, the time is well spent just for that: but it might also provide 
a basis for more harmonious and humble interdisciplinary work. The evasions and 
defensive tactics that disciplinary tribes deploy to retain their integrity inevitably 
become more obvious in an interdisciplinary context because of the variety of 
immediately available vantage points and values: what one discipline wishes to 
sidestep may be of great interest to another. In a disciplinary setting, those values 
are (and must be) taken for granted but not so in interdisciplinary contexts where 
no value is self-evident. Nor can they be persuasively articulated because to do so 
requires a position that must itself assume values (Fish, 1994, 1995): these values 
are just as contestable. Once again, we face infinite regress. 
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Threshold Concepts as Our Common Ground 
Put differently, the interdisciplinary group does not have shared threshold 
concepts: even experts on rational decision-making (eg anthropologists and 
economists, or economists and epidemiologists) may immediately find themselves 
at loggerheads (see eg Douglas & Ney, 1998; Joffe, 2011), This is entirely 
harmonious with the notion of threshold concepts providing initiates with a 
distinctive gaze, but can easily become disruptive as academics move to defend or 
extend their disciplinary base. But, in the framework being outlined here, what they 
have in common is that, for our heuristic purposes, they all operate with threshold 
concepts. These do not compete or invite competition, but are discrete: they are the 
site of incommensurability. Framed thus as an inquiry into one’s disciplinary 
framework, we are less likely to encounter bald statements such as  ‘history’s not a 
proper discipline then’ (as a chemistry PhD student once bluntly responded to me 
after I explained that interpretation can profoundly shape evidence in history). 
Threshold concepts are thus potentially a great leveller, and their articulation at 
some point, whether deliberately or piecemeal, is usually a necessary part of 
collaboration. 
 
To some academics, of course, this might be unacceptably close to relativism, and 
indeed exposure to this kind of epistemic pluralism might well appear to 
complicate the transmission of  ‘true’ disciplinary knowledge. For many students, 
also, it will be a challenge to encounter avowedly pluralistic regimes of truth, 
since, as every teacher knows, the cult of the  ‘right answer’ is alive and well: 
claims to truth are so seductive (and the elucidation of  ‘claim’ is harder even than 
the deconstruction of  ‘truth’ much of the time). But such a move is hardly out of 
step with the rest of the university: in so many subjects, we are increasingly 
teaching students to deal with not-knowing (eg Barnett, 2000, Land 2012). There 
is, however, also the practical difficulty that so few academics can make authentic 
claims to expertise in more than one field or, to put it differently, the fact that 
successful interdisciplinarians typically struggle to get and/or retain employment 
(Lattuca, 2001, pp. 178–184). 
Nonetheless, all kinds of possibilities for more reflexive and outward-facing 
disciplinary work beckon, with all the possibilities, challenges and difficulties that 
shared endeavours guarantee and what is often needed is ways for different  ‘tribes’ 
to retain their integrity without impinging on others'. We would have to accept that 
knowledge changes in different contexts: as Fish (1995, pp. viii-x) puts it,  ‘[social 
constructivist] accounts of how disciplines come into being are correct, but ... such 
accounts, rather than telling us that disciplines are unreal tell us just how 
disciplines came to be as real and as productive as they are'. 
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More urgently, and to bring the focus back to students, it may bring enormous 
relief to students who are trying to synthesise incompatible knowledge systems, not 
yet realising they are beyond the reach of  ‘right answers', to have this aspect of 
interdisciplinary work deliberately presented to them: incommensurability can then 
become an intriguing puzzle and a mystery that can be put aside or picked up as 
they need or choose rather than a set of dilemmas they must resolve (but never 
can). 
Bringing  ‘threshold guardianship’ out of the shadows could allow students to 
avoid being dominated by the conflicting demands put upon them by 
interdisciplinary work: it could create a much more level playing field for 
interdisciplinary work; and, if we place any stock in their pedagogic value, it would 
unlock all kinds of doors for teaching and learning. 
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